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Between 1938 and 1967, including the Bretton Woods period after 1947, 
Colombia pegged its currency to the dollar. Although the exchange rate was 
fixed, the peso was devaluated more than 12% on six occasions. The 
devaluation episodes were complex, traumatic, highly politicized and had costly 
macroeconomic effects. The Bretton Woods agreement stated that countries 
could only devalue their exchange rate in the presence of fundamental 
imbalances driven, for example, by structural terms of trade deterioration. 
However, this paper states that in Colombia, the imbalance in the money 
market was a key factor in explaining the exchange rate crises during the 
period. The paper is organized as follows: first, a simple theoretical model of a 
small open economy with imperfect capital mobility is described in order to 
examine the possible causes of nominal devaluations; second, a narrative 
approach is used to describe the economic circumstances that surrounded 
each of the devaluation episodes; finally, a set of econometric tests are used in 
order to identify the key variables behind the macroeconomic imbalances that 
preceded each exchange rate crisis. The results show that the external 
imbalances were mainly associated with the imbalances in the money market. 
Terms of trade deterioration account for just a small part of current account 
crises. 
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Entre 1938 y 1967, lo cual incluye el período de Bretton Woods después de la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial, Colombia fijó su tipo de cambio al dólar. A pesar de 
que el régimen cambiario operó bajo el esquema de fijación del tipo de cambio, 
el peso fue devaluado oficialmente en más de 12% en seis ocasiones. Los 
episodios de devaluación fueron complejos, traumáticos, con un alto 
componente político e implicaron ajustes macroeconómicos costosos. El 
acuerdo de Bretton Woods sostenía que los países podían devaluar sus 
monedas sólo en presencia de desequilibrios fundamentales como resultado, 
por ejemplo, de caídas estructurales de sus términos de intercambio. Sin 
embargo, este trabajo sostiene que los desequilibrios en el mercado monetario 
fueron determinantes en la explicación de las crisis cambiarias durante el 
período de cambio fijo. El ensayo está organizado en tres partes. Primero, se 
plantea un modelo teórico simple para una economía pequeña y abierta con 
movilidad imperfecta de capitales en el que se puedan analizar las posibles 
causas de las devaluaciones nominales. En segundo lugar, se emplea un 
enfoque narrativo para describir las circunstancias económicas que rodearon 
cada una de las devaluaciones: así como la revisión de evidencia cualitativa de 
la época. Finalmente, se realiza un conjunto de ejercicios econométricos para 
identificar las variables determinantes de los desequilibrios macroeconómicos 
que precedieron cada crisis cambiaria. Los resultados muestran que los 
desajustes externos estuvieron primordialmente asociados con desequilibrios 
en el mercado monetario. Los movimientos adversos en los términos de 
intercambio explican sólo una pequeña porción de las crisis cambiarias.  
 
Palabras clave: Bretton Woods, devaluación, régimen de cambio fijo, política 
monetaria. 
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The close relation between changes in the stock of money and changes in other economic 
variables, alone, tells nothing about the origin or the direction of origin of either or the 
direction of influence. The monetary changes might be dancing to the tune called by 
independently originating changes in the other economic variables; the changes in income and 
prices might be dancing to the tune called by independently originating monetary changes; the 
two might be mutually interacting, each having some elements of independence; or both might 
be dancing to the common tune of still a third set of influences. A great merit of the examination 
of a wide range of qualitative evidence, so essential in a monetary history, is that it provides a 
basis for discriminating between these possible explanations of the observed statistical 
covariation. 
 
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz 




I.A  General Overview  
 
On September 1931, the conversion of the Central Bank’s (Banco de la 
República) bills was suspended, ending the Gold Standard exchange rate 
system that had been in effect since the creation of the Central Bank in 1923
1. 
Since then, one of the goals of the Central Bank’s policy was to stabilize the 
exchange rate. After some years of controlled flotation, in 1938 Banco de la 
República Board of Directors pegged the exchange rate to the American dollar 
at $1.75 pesos, beginning a period in which the economic authorities committed 
themselves to defend the fixed parity with the American currency. This 
exchange rate system functioned for almost thirty years, until March 1967 when 
a crawling peg regime was adopted. 
 
The first challenge to the exchange rate system occurred during World War II 
when the paralysis of imports, brought about by significant foreign reserves 
accumulation, created strong devaluation pressures. After World War II, the 
period was defined by a new international monetary system with the signing of 
the Bretton Woods Agreement. This new system abolished the Gold Standard, 
leading to a fixed parities policy (adjustable) relative to the American dollar
2. 
 
The parity was adopted under the assumption that floating exchange rates had 
caused speculative instability and that more rigid systems required increased 
monetary discipline. However, the system created the possibility for the 
economies that had transitory deficits in their current account to obtain loans by 
the recently created International Monetary Fund (IMF). The system also 
allowed the countries to modify their fixed parities under adverse structural 
                                                 
1 The creation of the Banco de la República in 1923 allowed the return to the Gold Standard that 
had tried to be restored since the end of the Guerra de los Mil Días (Thousand Days War). The 
gold support of the bank bills in circulation – convertibles in gold – and in deposits was 
determined in 60%. More details, Sánchez, et.al (2005). 
2 Under the Bretton Woods system the American dollar was anchored to an invariable price 
related to gold. Moving form a “Gold Standard” to an “Exchange Gold Standard” regime, where 
the United States was liable for maintaining the value of the dollar related to gold.    4
changes in the external sector caused by, for example, a continuous fall in their 
terms of trade
3. 
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Eichengreen (1996) describes the arrival of the Welfare State and the 
politicizing of monetary and exchange decisions as the main characteristics of 
the Bretton Woods period. He emphasized that the internal objectives, 
especially the commitment of maintaining full employment, began to prevail 
over others, such as the protection of the exchange rate and price stability
4. 
Therefore, after World War II, the fixed exchange rate (adjustable) served to 
correct the external disequilibrium through it’s devaluation without suffering a 
long and costly adjustment through deflation. However these devaluations were 






                                                 
3  It is important to emphasize that the Bretton Woods Agreement was not sufficiently clear on 
this issue as it never defined what a fundamental disequilibrium meant (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
1997). 
4 The recessive and deflating policy of the Central Bank, which had solved the payment deficit 
under the Gold Standard, was not acceptable from the political point of view. Under the Gold 
Standard when a country had an external deficit an adjustment mechanism operated 
automatically through gold and price flows. The deficit reduced the amount of money and credit, 
creating deflation and recession, and depreciating the exchange rate in real terms. This     
reduced the demand for imports and reestablished the external equilibrium. The Central Bank 
played an important role in this mechanism because the reduction in the amount of money 
occurred through policies that restricted exchange rate increments.   5
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Six important devaluations (more than 12%)
5 took place in Colombia during the fixed 
exchange period, as shown in Figure 1.1. These exchange adjustments appear to be 
more pronounced than those that took place during other periods of exchange rate 
alterations. Additionally, there were other common devaluation patterns during this 
period. First, they were preceded by historically low levels of official reserves (as a 
proportion of the GDP) which validate the name “balance of payments crises” for these 
episodes (Figure 1.2). 
 




























Official purchase Official sale Free market sale Source: Wiesner (1978)
 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description of the history of the exchange legislation that carried every 
devaluation, see the Appendix. 
7 Edwards and Santaella (1992) discuss the most important devaluations that occurred in the 
developing countries (including Colombia) during the Bretton Woods period and the particular 
circumstances that surrounded them.   6
 
Second, the exchange rate crises coincided with the anticipated exchange rate 
devaluation in the parallel markets. These consisted of one or more “semi-free” 
markets where the price of foreign currency was determined by the dollars’ 
demand and supply. This was determined by selected types of imports and 
exports previously announced by the economic authorities (Figure 1.3). 
However, the the Central Bank frequently intervened in the dollar markets in 
order to minimize their volatility and to fix the price of foreign currency at the 
desired level. 
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Third, the exchange rate adjustments under the parity regime were 
accompanied by strong fluctuations in production activity (Figure 1.4), which 
seemed to be preceded by falls in the current account and acceleration in 
inflation. (Figure 1.5) 
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However, it seems that the devaluations during this period were not 
systematically associated with adverse changes in the terms of trade. In fact, 
the first three devaluations occurred in the middle of a growth period, or at a 
positive level of this indicator. Finally, the adjustments of the nominal exchange 
rate did not appear to determine a permanent change in the real exchange rate 
level, except for the 1957 devaluation. 
 
   7
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1.B Literature on Bretton Woods period in Colombia 
 
Few papers have studied the exchange rate behavior in Colombia during the 
Bretton Woods period or the determinants of the devaluations
7. Wiesner (1978) 
presents a detailed analysis of the Colombian fixed exchange rate and its 
modifications. However, he does not seem to reach a full conclusion about the 
general conditions that surrounded each one of the devaluations: 
 
In general there does not seem to be any constant rule about the sequence of the 
devaluations, (…). There were plenty and variable methods to stop, suspend, differ and 
repair the problem in which the devaluating processes do not, could not show a typical 
relation of causality or development sequence
8. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the author follows a hypothesis in which coffee 
exports play a determinant role in the exchange rate disequilibrium during this 
period. He asserts “simply, the astonishing presence of coffee in the exports 




Diaz-Alejandro (1976) analyzes the devaluations and their economic effects in 
Colombia. He argues that the fixed exchange rate had little impact in the 
diversification of exports because of the instability that characterised the real 
exchange rate during the period. According to the author, the 1967 reform had a 
positive impact on exports, not because the real exchange rate rose 
significantly, but because it made it more stable. 
 
Musalem (1971) explores the relation between the money market and the 
exchange rate disequilibrium events in Colombia during the analyzed period. 
The paper demonstrates the deep relationship between money demand, current 
account situation, and changes in the exchange rate. The author concludes that 
the disequilibrium, produced by crisis expectation in the balance of payments 




                                                 
8 Original text in Spanish. 
9 Wiesner does not present any quantitative evidence for this. Original text in Spanish. 
10 Salazar (1996).shows in further detail the monetary policy in this period.    8
In contrast to the Colombian historical literature (Wiesner, 1978), which 
associates the balance of payments crises (severe falls in international 
reserves) with the deterioration in the terms of trade during this period, our 
hypothesis states that crises were originated in the exogenous growth of money 
stock produced by expansive monetary policy. We follow the monetary 
approach of the balance of payments crises which claims that the disequilibrium 




This paper consists of five sections, and this introduction makes up the first one. 
In the second section, a theoretical macroeconomic model explains the possible 
conditions of devaluation under the fixed exchange rate. The third section 
analyzes the circumstances that surrounded each devaluation using qualitative 
and narrative evidence on the monetary decisions. The fourth section presents 
the quantitative evidence on the main determinants of the exchange rate 
behavior during the fixed exchange rate period in Colombia. Section five 
concludes the paper. 
 
II. A simple theoretical framework 
 
The model in this section is used to explain the behavior of an economy, in this 
case the Colombian economy, during the fixed exchange rate period. The 
model attempts to reproduce: (i) the main stylized fact of the devaluations, such 
as the previous fall of foreign reserves; and (ii) the impact of a shock to terms of 
trade or an expansionary demand policy, that according to the literature were 
both associated with devaluations.  
 
The model is built within a Mundell-Fleming framework and assumes that the 
economy is small and that capital has imperfect mobility. It is represented by 
two markets: the goods and the money market. The equilibrium in the goods 
market is represented by the following equation:  
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Where, yt represents the short-term equilibrium of income,  y  the long run level 
(in absence of disturbances),  ρ   the degree of persistence of previous 
fluctuations around its equilibrium level, b the sensibility of income to variations 
of the interest rate (i),  G  the public expenditure level, and BC the trade 
balance
12. The latter is represented in the following equation as a function of the 
real exchange rate, the deviation of the income level, and the terms of trade: 
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11  Frenkel and Johnson (1976) give more bibliographic references for this approach. 
12 In the same way, the variation of investment, public expenditure and trade balance have to be 
considered as deviations of their long run level which are contained in y .    9
Where  ) (
*
t t p p e − + is (a linear approach of) the real exchange rate with e as the 
nominal exchange rate, p* is the foreign price level and pt is the domestic price 
level. Likewise,  ) (
* P P
X
t −  is (a linear approach of) the terms of trade, where 
X
t P   
is the price of exports. The parameters  β γ,  and  λ  reflect the sensibility of the 
trade balance to variations in the real exchange rate, economic cycle and terms 
of trade, correspondingly. 
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Where, the parameters  η   and  φ   reflect the sensibility of money demand to 
changes in the interest rate and income, respectively. 
 
Money supply is the second element of this market and fulfils the identity of the 
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Where, mt is the money stock level
13, 
d
t B  the Central Bank’s gross credit and 
f
t B  the level of official reserves (in dollars), which under fixed exchange rate 
increases (falls) with the trade surplus (deficit).  Thus, money stock is described 
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Finally, an equation of price formation that follows a Phillips Curve augmented 
with expectations such as:  
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We assume that expectations are adaptative, so nominal rigidities
14 can be 
introduced into the model, such as: 
 
) ( 1 1 y y p p t t t − + = − − ϕ  
 
With this theoretical framework, the equilibrium of the economy is the result of 
the simultaneous equilibrium of the money market and the goods market, as 
follows
15:  
                                                 
13 For simplicity a multiplier coefficient is assumed to equal one. 
14 In this way, the nominal rigidity introduced has as its objective to have transitory real effects 
of expansionary demand policies that validate its use. 
15 The interest rate is determined endogenously due to the assumption of imperfect mobility of 
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II.B A shock to the Terms of Trade 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, some authors, such as Wiesner (1978), 
argue that adverse variations in the terms of trade (as a result of coffee price 
fluctuations), appear to be one of the main explanations for the devaluations 
during the fixed parity period. Wiesners’ hypothesis fits within the above 
theoretical framework. In fact, Colombia as a coffee (single commodity) 
exporter, when suffering adverse shocks to terms of trade, found devaluation to 
be a safe and effective way to return to the long run output level, thereby 
avoiding the long and painful macroeconomic adjustment of a deflation path. 
 
To take into account this dynamic, an equation is introduced into the model that 
collects the evolution of the price of exports according to a stable long run 
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Where the export price level 
x
t P   is transitorily separated from its long run 
level,
x
LP P , because of 
x
t ε  shocks. 
  
Assuming an adverse shock

















The fall of the trade balance and the subsequent decrease of the foreign 
exchange reserves are the mechanisms in which the shock is transmitted to the 
equilibrium income. Price rigidity is an essential element of this process 
because it makes the real exchange rate disequilibrium occur in the short run. 
Further, rigidity leads to a slower adjustment through deflation and a bigger vis 
á vis output loss in the long-run level. 
 
Because a discrete variation of the exchange rate may accelerate the 
adjustment mechanism, there is need to pursue a devaluation policy. So, under 
the two possible exchange rate policies, the variation of income during the 
shock period is determined by: 
 
                                                 
16 For example, a great harvest in the international market of cereals.   11
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We can observe that the effect of devaluation on output is greater under a fixed 
exchange rate: 
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From those it is possible to prove that: 
 






























This explains why the exchange rate policy has positive effects on the variation 
of the equilibrium output. 
 
II.C An expansive monetary policy 
 
Another hypothesis explained in the literature review (Musalem, 1971) refers to 
the loss of reserves. This states that the variation of the exchange rate, in 
absence of shocks to the terms of trade, should be the result of money market’s 
disequilibrium. 
 
To fully understand this dynamic, the model introduces an expansionary 
monetary policy adopted by the Central Bank whose objective is to finance   12
public expenditure.  The equation that includes the expansionary fiscal policy 
financed by the Central Bank’s primary credit beginning in period t = 1 is: 
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As a result, the new equilibrium income during the shock period is affected by:  
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This explains why expansionary policy has positive effects on the variation of 
the equilibrium output. However, the expansionary policy may have permanent 
effects on the official reserves in absence of nominal exchange rate 
devaluation.  This will be explained in the following section. 
 
 
II.D A numerical example 
 
A simulation was done, assuming feasible values for the parameters of the 
model, to observe the reaction of the adjustment accounting for every analyzed 
shock. (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) 
 
In the first exercise (Figure 2.1), an adverse real shock in terms of trade, due to 
the transitory reduction on Px, led to a trade balance deficit and a fall in the 
equilibrium income. The counterpart of this is a decrease in money stock in the 
money market and a loss in foreign reserves. Devaluation policy allows the 
trade balance to improve at an increased rate through a greater depreciation of 
the real exchange rate. This will occur in the presence of a slow adjustment 
through deflation, if and only if, the exchange rate has not been devalued. This 
price adjustment mechanism causes the exchange rate to decrease slowly, and 
thereby, improves the trade balance and avoids a greater loss in foreign 
reserves. As a result, output decreases below its expected long run level.   
Output, the real exchange rate, and the trade balance return to their long run 
levels when the price adjustment is completed. 
 
In a monetary shock scenario, the adjustment takes place through an increase 
in public expenditure beginning from primary issuing via the Central Bank’s 
credit (Figure 2.2). When the price adjustment is incomplete, the fiscal impulse 
has real effects. On the other hand, if the fixed exchange rate is not adjusted 
and the price level increases, the trade balance would worsen due to real 
appreciation in the exchange rate. In the long run, once the price adjustment is 
completed and the effects on real activity have diminished, the exchange rate   13
remains at the appreciated level, producing a trade balance deficit and 
uncertain foreign reserves loss. 
 
This model builds on the two possible scenarios mentioned in the literature that 
refer to Colombian exchange rate devaluations. First, it considers devaluation 
as an appropriate instrument to accelerate macroeconomic adjustment and 
reduce foreign reserve loss in the presence of adverse terms of trade shocks.  
These may result from incidents such as a decline in international coffee prices 
in a single good export economy like that of Colombia. Conversely, from a 
monetary approach, the exchange adjustments may have their origins in a 
persistent primary credit emission to the public (or private) sector. Although this 
policy had real effects in the short run, once the price adjustment was 
completed, the effect was null. The primary issuing resulted in a permanent loss 
of foreign reserves, an indeterminate appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
and trade deficit. These factors created the necessary conditions for the 
devaluation to adjust this disequilibrium again.  
 
Throughout this paper we will work within the simple theoretical framework 
stated above. The next section will analyze the devaluating episodes in 
Colombia, and the final section will identify the main statistical links between the 
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Figure 2. 1 Simulation in presence of shocks to the terms of trade 

























































Fixed exchange rate Devaluation
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Tasa de Cambio Real
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III. Devaluations during the fixed exchange rate period in 
Colombia 
 
This section uses a narrative approach to provide a detailed historical review of 
the conditions and circumstances that surrounded the devaluations during the 
fixed parity period in Colombia
17. We document with primary sources the 
monetary policy decisions, the official position of the economic authorities, and 
public opinion
18. The analysis is also supported by descriptive statistics of 




III. A First postwar devaluation (December, 1948)  
 
The 1948 devaluation was a consequence of the macroeconomic disequilibrium 
created during World War II. U.S. entry in the conflict brought a critical fall in 
real imports in 1942, and economic stagnation during 1943 and 1944
20. This 
produced a trade surplus that was later followed by an increase in foreign 
reserves. The jump from US$ 20M to US$ 177M (Figure I.2) created strong 
pressures for the peso revaluation. However, the Alfonso López  administration 
protected the fixed exchange rate. Alfonso Araujo, the Minister of Finance, 
disqualified the proposals of the peso revaluation considering them “simple but 
dangerous for coffee growers”
21. 
 
Consequently, a disagreement over the Colombian peso revaluation occurred 
within the Central Bank’s Board of Directors. It was considered risky to modify 
the exchange rate because of the upheavals and consequences that it might 
have had on export associations. Additionally, abolishing the fixed parity system 
was inconvenient due to “the well-known benefits they had on the national 
economy”
22. Instead of revaluating, the authorities applied other measures such 
as the simplification of the imports’ control
23 and the sterilization of the balance 
                                                 
17 As explained in the international literature (Miron, 1994), the narrative approach inspired in 
the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) seminal paper is one of the most appropriated for the 
macroeconomic empirical analysis because it allows to solve the identification problem. In this 
particular case, the approach was identifying the exogenous economic policy episodes that had 
preceded the official devaluations.  
18 For the official position, refer to the Actas de la Junta Directiva del Banco de la República 
and the Editorial Notes of the Central Bank’s Governor in Revista del Banco de la República. 
To explain public opinion, we consulted the national newspapers and magazines of the periods 
that surrounded the exchange crisis episodes. 
19 The money market statistics are represented by monthly series of the money stock, the 
monetary base, the Central Bank’s gross domestic credit, and the net foreign reserves. The 
source of these variables was the Revista del Banco de la República. For variables related to 
the external sector, see the international coffee price, trade balance, and terms of trade. 
20 Having a 15% average as a proportion of the GDP since 1923, the imports fell to 7% in 1942 
and did not exceed 10% during subsequent years (GRECO, 2002). 
21 See “Exposicion de Motivos” of the Minister Araujo to the Camera Representatives, Revista 
del Banco de la República, October 1942. Original text in Spanish. 
22 See Acta de la Junta Directiva, September 10 1942, pp. 3370-3372. Original text in 
Spanish.  
23 Resolution 113 of the Oficina de Control de Cambios y Exportaciones; Decree 2580 of 1943. 
See Revista del Banco de la República, June 1942 and January 1944.   17
of payments surplus
24. An analysis of the Central Bank’s domestic credit shows 
that, since the middle of 1942 until 1944, the Central Bank’s total credit growth 
presented real decreases. Particularly in 1943, the Central Bank’s credit 
diminished 25% - the highest of the fixed exchange rate period
25. 
 
After World War II, imports increased thereby leading to a commercial deficit 
once again. To prevent the diminishing of reserves, a new imports control was 
instituted
26. Despite this disposition, the raise of the international coffee price, 
(Figure III.1) and the recovery of the terms of trade (Figure I.6), the post-war 
period was characterized by a permanent fall in the reserves that accumulated 
during World War II. Thus, between 1946 and 1947 reserves fell from US$ 
186m to US$ 124m. At the beginning of 1947, the Central Bank’s Board of 
Directors believed that foreign currency devaluation was the best way to solve 
the problem. However, this decision was delayed by President Ospina-Pérez 
who opted to strengthen imports’ control and promote more foreign loans.  
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Since the beginning of 1947, a monetary disequilibrium existed due to an 
annual growth rate in the Central Bank’s credit that exceeded 50%. It was 
driven by credit to the financial system, and produced a duplication of the 
domestic credit (Figure III.2). The complaints about the restrictions
27 on 
obtaining credit from commercial banks indicated in the analysis of the 1947 
Central Bank Board of Directors meeting minutes illustrates their interest in 
                                                 
24 See Revista del Banco de la República, May 7 of 1943, p. 3468. 
25 Between 1942 and 1943, the total amount of the Central Bank’s credit balance fell from $110 
millions to $70 millions, with credit to particulars (Particulars or individuals?) and banks being 
the most restricted items. See Revista del Banco de la República. 
26 These were stated in Resolutions 143 and 508, of 1945 and 1946, respectively. The objective 
was to define a rational way of using the reserves accumulated during the War period on the 
modernization and increment (increment or expansion) of industrial and transport equipment, 
and ensuring it was not squandered on consumption goods. 
27 See Acta de la Junta Directiva, April 14 of 1947, p. 4072.   18
increasing loans. During September of this same year, the Central Bank’s total 
credit amount registered an annual growth of 102% - the highest throughout the 
period being studied (Figure III.2)
29. 
 
At the beginning of 1948, the Central Bank recognized that the sharp increase 
in credit during the previous year would carry inflationary consequences. 
Regardless, they did not appear to employ any measures to reverse the trend. 
The assassination of Jorge E. Gaitán in April (pre-candidate of the Liberal 
Party) only caused the situation to grow more complex. Public opinion was 
agitated and the Central Bank’s expansionary credit operations continued to 
increase. 
 































































































International Reserves Banco República's Total Credit
 
 
The monetary growth produced by the strong primary issuing began to have 
effects on money stock and price growth. By the middle of 1948, annual growth 
in money stock reached close to 20% (Figure III.3), while inflation was 
approaching 16% (Figure I.5). 
                                                 
29 Loans to National Government and commercial banks grew during that year at monthly rates 
closed to 5%.   19
 





























































Money Stock Monetary Base
 
After the IMF approval, the government surrendered it’s protection of the 
exchange rate through Law 90. This marked the first devaluation of the post-war 
period and fixed the exchange rate at $1.96 pesos per dollar - a 12% 
depreciation. The exchange rate system had two markets: an official market 
with different rates, and an exchange certificates market with fluctuating rates  
where the foreign currency supply of the latter came from non-traditional 
exports
30). Law 90 won popular approval and, according to the press, was noted 




III.B Second devaluation (March, 1951)  
 
After the 1948 devaluation, domestic credit in the financial system was 
temporarily stabilized, thereby allowing the government to avoid the monetary 
expansion that occurred over the previous two years. By April 1949, the annual 
growth in money stock was down to 12%, and by July, domestic credit for banks 
had decreased by 16%. However, consistently high international coffee prices 
(Figure III.1)
32 helped to reverse the downward trend of the official reserves that 
had been taking place over the previous five years (Figure I.2). Furthermore, 
the decrease in administrative expenses and the increase in tax revenue 
(Figure III.4) added to budgetary improvements. 
 
 
                                                 
30 The information registered on press reports that Government and IMF will keep working to get  
the unification and simplification of the exchange system. Even of IMF’s approval, it did not like 
the differential exchange rate system. See El Espectador (newspaper), December 17 of 1948. 
31 See El Espectador, December 17 of 1948. Original text in Spanish. 
32 As a result of a bad harvest in Brazil.   20
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With the stabilization of the money market  and the experience of the previous 
devaluation, the Central Bank’s Governor explained the need for focusing the 
government and private parties’ actions according to the situation of national 
resources, instead of resorting to emission policies as in previous periods, and 




The public safety problems due to political unrest were repeated at the end of 
1949. Following the November presidential elections, the government declared 
that public security was at risk. Such political turmoil caused significant 
monetary consequences as the public suddenly withdrew their savings, and 
caused abnormal growth in money demand. The Central Bank reacted by 
quickly increasing loan operations. According to the Central Bank’s Governor, 
this demonstrated the “institutions frank and decided support of the financial 
system complying one of the main functions of this organism”
34. 
 
Due to the circumstances, credit to the financial system increased from $84m in 
July of 1947, to $226m in December of 1950, an annual growth rate of close to 
90%
35. Once again, this had direct effects on money stock with growth rates 
approaching 30%. In the last trimester of 1950, inflation reached the highest 
level of the period, surpassing 27%. With these new events, foreign reserves 
returned to a state of decline (Figures III.5 and III.6).  
 
 
                                                 
33 See Editorial Notes in Revista del Banco de la República, July and September 1949. 
34 See Editorial Notes in Revista del Banco de la República, October and November 1949. 
Original text in Spanish. 
35 Besides this item became the most important within the Central Bank’s domestic credit 
(Sánchez, et.al. 2005). 
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Money Stock Monetary Base
 
 
In August of 1950, the new president, Laureano Gómez, appointed Antonio 
Álvarez as the Minister of Finance. The economic team was charged with 
implementing a series of decisions that aimed to stabilize the money market. 
Consequently the Government and the Central Bank acted in accordance with 
private investors to reach an inter-banking agreement consisting of an extra-
official limitation to credit known as the “Pacto de Caballeros” (Salazar, N., 
1996). 
   22
During the next nine months, the agreement was fulfilled and despite measures 
taken by the Central Bank to resist the quick fall of liquidity
36 (Figure III.6), 
quickly proved to have a highly restrictive effect on money circulation. Money 
contraction, produced by “Pacto de Caballeros”, had recessive consequences. 
Real output growth was 1.1%, the lowest level of the last seven years
38. The 
useless decisions that tried to change the effects of the agreement highlighted 
the need to introduce more effective instruments in Central Bank 
interventions
39. Along with the monetary system reform, a second devaluation 
was later instituted at 28%. 
 
Through Decree 637 on March 20, 1951, a propensity for a simpler exchange 
rate system was presented. The certificate market was abolished and it was 
instituted that all foreign currency sales and purchases would be done through 
the Central Bank at fixed rates of $2.51 and $2.50, respectively. Coffee foreign 
currency sales and purchases were an exception in which 75% was settled at 
an exchange rate of $1.95 and the remaining 25% at an exchange rate of $2.50 
(an average of $2.08). However these decisions led to protests from the coffee 
associations as they felt they were getting “discriminatory and unfair” 
treatment
40. Therefore, in less than three years, a new devaluation took place 
that reversed both real appreciation of the exchange rate (Figure I.6) as well as 
Central Bank reserve losses (Figure I.2). 
 
III.C The “Mega-Devaluation” (June, 1957)  
  
After a coup in mid 1953, General Gustavo Rojas-Pinilla took over as president. 
During the first two years of his dictatorship, economic growth was led by a rise 
in coffee prices from US$0.51 to US$0.91 (Figure III.1). The new government 
was forced to face the strong money stock and price growth produced by an 
accumulation in reserves (Figure I.2). With inflation reaching a two digit level for 
the first time since 1951, restrictive policies applied on imports were relaxed
41.  
 
In response to the coffee price dropping to US$ 0.59 in March of 1955, the 
dictator requested a complex tributary, trade, and exchange legislation focused 
on abolishing the external disequilibrium instead of devaluation. By May, the 
free dollar market was opened and importers were permitted to use it without 
                                                 
36 The measures of the Bank included a restriction to the bank reserve requirement level. See 
Sánchez, et.al. (2005). 
38 The electricity production growth index for industrial uses shows, for the first time since 1941, 
negative growth during an important period of the second semester. Source: Revista del 
Banco de la República.  
39 On April 5, 1951, the Extraordinary Decree 756 was implemented giving the Central Bank  
special powers to use credit, exchange and monetary policy to stimulate proper conditions for 
the “development of the Colombian economy.” This both increased former capabilities and 
created new means of intervening in money and credit regulation. 
40 See El Tiempo (newspaper), March 18 of 1951. 
41 An example of these policies was the Extraordinary Decree 513, February 19, 1954, in which 
a list of forbidden imports was eliminated.   23
tax duties or restrictions
42. Fearing the recessive consequences of a fall in 
coffee prices, various fiscal policies were adopted, including that which reduced 
a four year fiscal surplus (Figure III.4). 
 
Higher public expenditure was complemented with an expansionary monetary 
policy. During July, 1956, the authorities reduced the reserve requirements of 
short term liabilities and medium term deposits of commercial banks in three 
points (Figure III.12). These reductions were supported by the Central Bank’s 
Governor on the account of a liquidity drought in the money market
43. 
 
Nevertheless, the macroeconomic policy had little impact on diminishing the 
external disequilibrium. In spite of the trade decisions adopted, the external 
debts increased at an astonishing rate due to three consecutive years of trade 
deficit
44 (Figure III.7). To help the payment of those debts, a reduction of one 
additional point of reserve requirements for short term liabilities was instituted. 
Additionally, to increase the trade credit for the payment of stand-by imports, 
the government allowed foreign currency to be obtained at an exchange rate of 
50% in the official market and 50% in the free market. The Central Bank 
therefore began to issue money in order to finance the payment of external 
debts. This accelerated devaluation expectations and reduced the demand for 
domestic currency from economic agents. 
 



















                                                 
42 As a complement of this, some laws about imports were reviewed through (through??) the 
Decrees 3077 and 3572 which tried to restrict the level of those. 
43 See Editorial Notes in Revista del Banco de la República, June and July 1956. 
44 Similarly the external public debt in dollars increased by 26.1% between 1953 and 1956. 
Source: Principales Indicadores Económicos (1998).   24
During the second semester of 1956, the money growth rate increased from 
17.7% in August to 24.9% at the end of the year. Instead of counteracting this 
fact, the authorities increased the Central Bank’s credit for the public sector 
from $75m to $128m during the year. Along with the increment in the Public 
Debt Documents investment, this rose from $430m to $545m. Issuance used to 
finance the government reached an amount close to $170m, equivalent to 6% 
of the money stock. By July, the monetary base growth had reached 46.3% 
(Figure III.8) with foreign reserves loss. Therefore, during 1956 they registered 
an average of US$ 139m, as opposed to US$ 218m and US$ 155m during 
1954 and 1955, respectively (Figures III.8 and III.9). At the end of 1956, as 
shown in Figure I.3, an implicit devaluation of more than 100% was registered 
by the few official data of the parallel market. 


































































































International Reserves Total Credit
 
 






























































Money Stock Monetary Base
   25
 
During May 1957, the dictatorship was replaced by a military board that was put 
in charge of the transition to democracy. In June, Álvarez Restrepo, the new 
Minister of Finance, began a reform of the exchange rate regime that included a 
massive devaluation of the peso by nearly 100%
45 (the exchange rate would 
rise from $2.5 pesos per dollar to $4.9) and the creation of a floating exchange 
rate where the exchange certificates and capital markets would coexist
46. A list 
of forbidden imports was established in addition to other modifications to the tax 
regime
47. In spite of the magnitude of the exchange rate adjustment, seven 
months later, in March of 1958, the government had to carry out another 
devaluation as the exchange rate of the certificates market had risen from $4.9 
to almost $6 pesos per dollar. Therefore, through the implementation of Decree 
80 on March 26, the exchange rate of certificate purchases was established at 
$6.1 pesos/dollar. 
 
III.D Fiscal deficit and devaluation (November/1962)  
 
The stabilizing macroeconomic policy implemented by Minister Álvarez between 
1957 and 1960 reestablished the external sector equilibrium (Figure III.7), 
thereby impeding external debt growth. At the beginning of the 1960’s, 
macroeconomic stability was affected by deepening in the fiscal disequilibrium 
that had begun in 1961.  In addition, foreign reserves loss was faced by the 
León Valencia administration and the Minister of Finance, Sanz de Santamaría. 
 
During 1961 the fiscal deficit reached 2%, an amount that had not been 
observed during the fixed parity system (Figure III.4). The fiscal situation had 
been deteriorating since the end of the 1950`s, when, due to public security 
problems, the government’s income began to decrease while expenses were 
increasing. The largest decrease in the fiscal income was produced by the 
modification of the coffee policy. The 1957 exchange rate reform created a 15% 
tax on exports, which was destined to pay the commercial debt. However, in 
presence of ongoing pressures, it was reduced to 5% in 1960 and later 
                                                 
45 In reference to the magnitude and the adjustment of devaluation, the Minister said, “we are 
not going to implement the devaluation. It was implemented a long time ago”. See  El 
Espectador, June 17 1957. It is important to emphasise that the exchange rate of the free 
market was significantly far from the official exchange rate, a process that started at the 
beginning of 1956 (Figure I.3) 
46 According to the information of the national press, the total exchange flotation was defended 
by the big productive sectors, starting with the Coffee Growers. Government was supporting a 
“free directed” exchange rate system. The new system would have the IMF support which 
considered the decision proper to end the “complex multiple rates system” that was operating 
until then and channelled to the exchange rate unification. See El Espectador, June 17 and 18 
1957. 
47 The exchange reform was accompanied by trade control mechanisms to avoid the trade 
deficit accumulated during the dictatorship. One of these mechanisms was the previous import 
deposit in Central Bank that was getting importance because of its amount and it was 
considered another instrument of monetary control. For detailed information see Sánchez et.al. 
(2005).   26
abolished in 1961
48. The remaining fiscal deficit was financed with primary 
issuing through Public Debt Documents investment for amounts of $219.4m and 
legal government's share in Central the Bank for $42.2m.  
The central government promoted a bill that would authorize it to finance the 
1962 deficit through the Central Bank. Additionally, the project anticipated that 
the government could negotiate larger term loans with the Central Bank starting 
in 1963 and throughout the period of the new government’s Development Plan 
(destined to facilitate the allocation of resources towards internal public debt 
amortization and prolonging repayment during the execution of the Plan. The 
project had the compliance of the Central Bank’s Governor who said, during a 
discussion at Congress: 
 
“In this moment the process of (fiscal) deficit payment through Central Bank 
emissions, that in other circumstances would be advisable and on the 
contrary notoriously wrong, seems to be the only instrument available in the 
face of payment urgencies that compromise social tranquillity”
49. 
 
At the end of 1962 the Law was approved and the government had negotiated 
loans with the Central Bank for nearly $600m. The amount of the fiscal shock 
on the monetary equilibrium was observed through the growth of primary gross 
credit by more than $1.625m, 54% of the monetary base (Figure III.10)
50. 
 
The Central Bank’s Board of Directors made some decisions to mitigate the 
effects of money issuance with fiscal motivations on money stock. Between 
November, 1961 and January, 1962, the bank reserve requirements were 
raised in three points, one per month, reaching 25% in January. This was 
executed without making the seasonal reduction at the end of the year (Figure 
III.12). In addition, a marginal reserve requirement of 100% of the short term 
liabilities for the banking system was established. However, in spite of these 
measures, money stock growth accelerated, and by December it had exceeded 
20%. The effect of the emission was strongly reflected in the monetary base 
since no measures focused on sterilizing the primary issuance were considered. 
The Central Bank’s total annual growth discounts rose from 15.7% during the 
first semester of 1962, to 36.6% during the second semester, reaching 42.9% in 
December. During this month the monetary base was growing at a rate of 35%, 
the highest growth rate since the 1957 exchange rate crisis (Figure III.11)
51. 
 
                                                 
48 Similar to this tax was the coffee retention tax which had similar levels to the exports tax. In 
1961, the level applied to the rate was also modified, reducing it to 4% through Decree 2682 of 
October 27 1961. 
49 Revista del Banco de la República, October 1962. Original Text in Spanish. 
50 In the Central Bank official balance sheet, the “investment in public debt documents” was 
tripled rising from $705m in January 1961 to $2143 in just two years. The biggest increase took 
place between October and December of 1962 when the amount increased $902.6m. Equally, 
the “legal share of National Government” increased from nothing to $187.2 during the same 
period. 
51 The Central Bank’s Governor recognized that the measures adopted during the year, as the 
increase of the reserve requirement in January or the increment of the imports deposits in April, 
were not enough. (Revista del Banco de la República, second semester 1962). 
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Money Stock Monetary Base
 
 
As in previous episodes, the money growth’s acceleration was accompanied by 
official reserves loss (Figure III.10)
52 and severe changes in the exchange rate. 
As shown in Figure I.3, after the second semester of 1961, the free market 
exchange rate was far from the official exchange rate. In November 1962, with 
Resolution 20 and Law 83 were enacted with the advice of the IMF allowing  the 
Central Bank to institute a 34% devaluation increasing the certificates sale price 
at $9 pesos. At the same time, foreign currencies that came from the 
                                                 
52 This was worsening with the permanent fall of the coffee price. Between January 1961 and 
December 1962 the total reserves fell from US$ 204 M. to US$ 116 M.   28
exportation of certain goods were reallocated to the free market, creating a fund 
for the financing of the capital goods imports and the previous financing of 
exports
53. To warrant the exchange rate stability, the country signed up a stand-
by agreement with the IMF for US$50m.   
 














III.E Two devaluations and the end of the fixed exchange rate system 
(September, 1965 and March, 1967) 
 
In 1963, the Monetary Board was created. It was placed in charge of studying 
monetary, exchange and credit decisions, which were of concern to the Central 
Bank’s Board of Directors up to this point
54. In January of 1964, the Monetary 
Board raised the exchange rate of the foreign currencies originating from coffee 
and capital imports with the intention to explore and exploit oil, with exchange 
rates ranging from $7.10 to $7.30. The Coffee Federation insisted on 
implementing this decision, which allowed them to move forward in the abolition 
of the exchange rate differential.  In July, coffee was established as the only 
                                                 
53 This revaluation episode would be particularly shaken because some members accused the 
government of favouring “oligarchic interests” with the exchange policy and to have a “national 
oligopoly” in the National Treasure represented by the Banco de la. República. Consequently,  
an inter-parliamentary commission was designated to serve as a mediator between the 
executive and the legislative. After some deliberations, the commission adopted the IMF 
formula of a unique devaluation relative to the government gradual devaluation formula.  El 
Espectador, November 21 and 26, 1962. For a detailed analysis of this devaluation, see Lleras 
Camargo (1963).  
54 For a detailed description of the Colombian Central Bank’s evolution, see Sánchez, et.al. 
(2005).    29




As shown in Figure I.3, between 1963 and 1964, the Central Bank frequently 
intervened in the foreign currency “free” market to keep its price stable and to 
avoid a larger gap between exchange rates. However, at the end of October 
1964, pressures on foreign reserves proved to be unsustainable. Between 
September 1 and October 24 the Central Bank had to sell US$30m (almost 
20% of its stock)
56. As a result, the sale of foreign currency in the free market
57 
was suspended; it had reached $14m by the end of the year (Figure I.3). In 
spite of the pressures of devaluation, the Monetary Board decided to keep the 
price of the exchange certificates at $9.0 pesos/dollar. 
 
Since the beginning of 1965, the gap between the free dollar and the exchange 
rate certificates rate continued. However, this was unsustainable since the 
difference between the two exchange rates obliged the Central Bank to buy 
foreign currencies that came from the minor exports at the previous week 
average rate - thereby transferring these currencies to the certificates market. 
Of course, this was a deficit operation because it had to sell them at the $9 
pesos/dollar rate. As a result, in addition to the inflationary consequences of the 
exchange operation, it generated severe losses for the State’s budget.  
 
Even after some exchange rate regime modifications during the first semester 
of 1965
58, the official reserves diminished from US$147m to US$104 during the 
same period. However, data on net reserves (without Central Bank short run 
liabilities) demonstrated negative values from that point forward (Figure III.13). 
Under the circumstances, government created a new exchange rate reform in 
September of 1965. The auctions system for exchange certificates sale was 
abolished and two official markets were created: the preferential and the 
intermediate. The first one was supported by dollars that came from coffee 
exports, and products with an import component of 50% or more would be used 
to finance imports of authorized products at this preferential rate. The price of 
                                                 
55 This stimulated the minor exports market which had a higher exchange rate. See Decree 
1734 of July 17 1964. 
56 The Minister of Finance points to speculation over the exchange rate as the cause of this 
situation, which yielded political instability at the beginning of September. (Acta de la JM, 
October 25, folio 286) 
57 Resolution 46 of October 25, 1964. At first the Minister of Finance advocated the adoption of 
exchange control, but this measure was rejected because of the risk of producing a severe 
devaluation in the certificates market.  
58 The first exchange modifications were done in the coffee sector. In March of 1965, coffee 
retention was increased, reaching 8%. This was redeemed with an increase in the purchase 
price from $7.30 to $7.67 (pesos per dollar?) which came from coffee exports. The decision 
attempted to intervene by supplying the resources needed in the coffee market without using 
Central Bank’s credits. The Federation’s compromise was to get the equilibrium between 
domestic and international coffee price. The purchase price that came from minor exports was 
modified from the free dollar rate used by the Central Bank the previous week (remember that in 
July 1964 coffee had been established as the only mayor export so the other exports would 
quote at the free exchange rate). Since June 29 the Monetary Board fixed the exchange rate at 
$13.5. This was the average between the certificates market $9 rate and the free market $18 
rate. This is why it can be taken as a revaluation related to the last rate.   30
coffee foreign currency was fixed at $8.5 for purchases and $9 for sales
59. In 
the intermediate market there was negotiation of foreign currencies that came 
form coffee exports. The exchange certificate sale price was fixed at $13.5 
pesos per dollar, leading to a 50% official devaluation
60. The exchange rate for 
the minor exports was also applied to a growing list of imports. 
 
The complex exchange rate structure was a result of the reforms attempt to 
keep three different exchange rates: the preferential imports faced a $9 rate, the 
intermediate imports a $13.5 rate, and the capital free market a rate that ranged 
from $18 to $20 (Figure I.3). 
 
In February of 1966, through Resolution 8, the Monetary Board implemented 
some measures focused on adopting an expansionary behavior in monetary 
policy. First, the remainder of the 40% marginal bank reserve requirement that 
had been valid since December 1962 was abolished
61 and other measures 
were arranged for financing production. During March of 1966, as an incentive 
to agricultural production, the investment of one point of the reserves 
requirements ordered in January was offered as credit to industries that 
produced popular food. Through Resolution 23 of May 11, the Monetary Board 
authorized the Central Bank to create the Fondo Financiero Agrario (Agrarian 
Financing Fund) to take charge of fostering, directing and supervising, rural 
credit programs. The Resolution updated the proportion that could be focused 
on fostering operations, which had been frozen since July, 1964
62.  
 
Fostering policy was accompanied by expansionary monetary policy toward the 
private sector. Therefore, commercial banks asked for the reserves requirement 
reduction to improve their liquidity position. The Monetary Board responded with 
Resolutions 27 and 31 in June which regulated the access to emergency quotas 
in the Central Bank, reduced the ordinary bank reserve requirement of short 
term liabilities (less than 30 days) by one percenteage point, and allowed banks 
to divert another point of their reserve requirement to Fondo Financiero 
Agrario
63. 
As a result of the policy, money stock growth accelerated (Figure III.14). 
However, the results were not the ones expected by authorities. At the end of 
1966, the Central Bank’s Governor suggested that the liquidity during the year 
had been channelled to import activities on account of the high growth of import 
                                                 
59 The $0.5 differential would be split up between the Fondo Nacional del Café (National Coffee 
Fund) ($0.4) and the remainder for the coffee growers development campaigns. 
60 That price generated a contentious discussion within the Monetary Board because the 
estimate presented to and approve by international organizations was a $14 rate. However, 
because of the Ministry of Finance’s previous announcements about the $13.5, the rate was 
maintained. (See Resolution 32 September 1965)- 
61 According to Monetary Board data, with Resolution 8 a primary expansion close to 65% may  
be produced and instead of increasing through the banking system it would be introduced to 
other increments, such as the new credits of Fondo de Inversión Privada (Private Investment 
Fund). See Actas de la Junta Monetaria, February 1966.  
62 For an analysis of policy on economic development instituted by the Central Bank and its 
relationship to the development of the financial system, see Fernández, et.al. (2005). 
63 Source: Actas de la Junta Monetaria, first semester 1966.   31
deposits in the Central Bank
64. Therefore during the first semester, this account 
grew at a monthly average of US$51.3m, exceeding 25% of what was observed 
during the second semester of 1965
65.  During 1966, the average foreign 
currency level was US$133m, the lowest since 1951. At the same time, net 
foreign reserves reached negative values of US$134m between October and 
November 1966 (Figure III.13). 
 
Finally, as coffee and small export revenues fell, and import revenues 
increased, the Lleras-Restrepo administration adopted a new exchange control 
that ended the liberalization of imports. The Emergency Decree 2867 of 
November 29 suspended the dollar-free market and established that the Central 
Bank was the only one that could buy foreign currency and gold. Additionally, 
the capital market was created and fixed a purchase and sale price of $16.25 
and $16.3 pesos per dollar, respectively. This was the end of the fixed 
exchange rate system and marked the beginning of the Central Bank’s crawling 
peg regime. Under the new system, devaluation reached 17% between March 
and December 1967. 
 
 

































































































                                                 
64 Source: Notas Editoriales del Gerente del Banco de la República, in Revista del Banco de la 
República; septiembre 1966. 
65 It is important to remember that Musalem’s (1971) imports demand was a speculative 
exchange mechanism in the presence of money supply that exceeded money demand.   32
 
 


































































The previous section presented a narrative that discussed the circumstances 
surrounding the devaluations during the fixed parity regime in Colombia. 
Specifically, the economic authorities’ position and the monetary policy 
decisions were documented in every balance of payments crisis.  In summary, 
despite the unique aspects of each episode, it is possible to document the 
presence of monetary disequilibrium and the accelerated fall of foreign reserves 
that preceded each devaluation. In the devaluations in December of 1948 and 
March of 1951, a significant liquidity growth was observed as a result of the rise 
in domestic credit. Likewise, in the June of 1957 “mega” devaluation, a large 
money issuing was observed, which was destined to finance the payment of the 
external liabilities generated by the trade disequilibrium. This was likely to have 
increased the devaluation expectations and as a result, further reduced the 
liquidity demand of the economic agents. 
 
During the November 1962 crisis, the monetary disequilibrium causes were 
produced by the deterioration of public finances and financing through primary 
money issuance. Finally, the September 1965 and March 1967 devaluations 
that occurred during the transition to the new regime were surrounded by a 
policy for economic fostering that stemmed from pre-determined credit by the 
Monetary Board. The foreign reserves low levels accelerated the adoption of 
the new exchange rate regime. 
 
The next section quantifies the relationship between money market 
disequilibrium and the evolution of foreign reserves in addition to other factors 
that could explain the official devaluation of the exchange rate.   33
 
IV. Econometric Evidence. 
 
This section explores the econometric evidence related to the hypothesis of the 
paper that monetary disturbances were the main causes of the balance of 
payments crises during the fixed parity period in Colombia. This data is 
compared with the empirical evidence that could exist in favor of an alternative 
hypothesis, in which real shocks were the cause of the decline in external 
assets that led to the devaluation episodes. Finally, it is demonstrated that an 
“active” monetary authority was a key cause of the real and monetary 
disequilibrium. 
 
The econometric approach begins by testing money demand stability during the 
analyzed period. The empirical test of this assumption enables one to continue 
with the exercises that join the rise in the domestic assets (i.e. the increase of 
the government financing with primary issuance) with deteriorations in foreign 
reserves that led to each of the crises. 
 
IV. Money demand during the fixed parity period. 
 
Based on the theoretical framework presented in the second section, it is 
possible to conclude that if money demand is stable, in absence of real shocks, 
foreign reserves loss may stem from the Central Bank’s domestic credit 
increase. For this reason, we will begin with the money demand estimation and 
the evaluation of its stability during the period. 
 
The following money demand function is estimated (M): 
   t t t t i Yr P M ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 3 2 1 0 β β β β          (Equation IV.1) 
Where, M is money stock (M1); P is the price level; Yr is the real output level; 
and i is the interest rate
66. The frequency of the variables is annual due to the 
availability for the data set (1938-1967, and in logs, except for the interest rate. 




Tests show presence of cointegration. In fact, the two tests accepted the 
hypothesis of stability in the parameters of the money demand function (See 
Appendix) and implied an association between the foreign reserves reductions 
and other macroeconomic that were different from structural changes in money 
demand. 
 
IV.B  Money sterilization and compensation effect. 
 
The results mentioned above allow us to reject instability in money demand as 
the main explanation of the foreign reserves volatility during the fixed parity 
period. Therefore we proceed to quantify simultaneously (i) the compensation 
                                                 
66 The source of the monetary statistics is Sánchez, et.al. (2005). The other variables are taken 
form GRECO(2002). 
67 The results of these tests are shown in the Appendix.   34
effect magnitude, which means that foreign reserves loss are caused by money 
excess (in addition to other real factors that could be significant); and (ii) the 
degree of money sterilization, which refers to the authorities’ reaction to 
neutralize the effect of changes in foreign reserves on money circulation.  
 
To describe the compensation effect, it is necessary to define the monetary 
base as the sum  of the official reserves in pesos (external component), and the 
domestic assets (internal component)
68. Thus: 
 
                                                  BMt = Rt + ADt                                              (Equation IV.2) 
As in the theoretical model, under the fixed parity regime, the authorities did not 
control the whole monetary base. Although the Central Bank determines the 
domestic component, AD, it does not have control on the external component, 
R which is the foreign reserves in local currency. Therefore, in absence of 
structural changes of money demand, changes in the domestic component –
further than the needed to satisfy money demand- are totally compensated by 
changes in the external component. This is known as the monetary approach of 
the balance of payments. 
 
Equation IV.3 represents the compensation effect. This measures the relation 
between the exchange rate and the foreign reserves in the presence of a 
change in domestic assets. It is controlled by other variables that may 
independently affect the reserve’s evolution, such as changes in terms of trade, 
proxies of economic activity for the monthly consumption of electricity for 
industrial uses, and dummy variables in each of the months where a 
devaluation causes a rise in R, because it took place a price effect on the 
foreign reserves in pesos valuation
69. 
 
As explained in the historical review, the monetary authorities’ behavior was not 
passive. Even if they were functioning under a fixed parity regime, the 
authorities reacted by increasing domestic assets and sterilizing changes in 
external assets in addition to other macroeconomic disequilibrium particularly, 
from these new instruments of monetary policy and the new functions of the 
Central Bank established in Decree 756 of 1951
70. For this reason, it is 
necessary to assert a reaction function that simultaneously shows the effect of 
this behavior. 
 
                                                 
68 In the Colombia specific case, domestic assets are compounded by credit to national 
government, the financial sector (commercial banks and the other financing institutions), the 
private sector, investment on Public Debt deposits, and gross non-monetary assets (Other non 
monetary assets minus other non monetary liabilities). The primary source to obtain these 
series were the Monthly Balances of Banco de la República available in  Revista del Banco de 
la República 
69 For this equation, other variables were also taken into account that may affect the evolution of 
the reserves but that were not significant in the estimation. These variables included trade 
balance (as a percentage of the GDP) and custom revenues (as a proportion of imports) as a 
proxy for customs rate. The source of those variables was Revista del Banco de  la 
República. 
70 Urrutia and Fernández (2003) present evidence in favor of independent monetary policy 
including the fixed exchange arrangement in Colombia.   35
Equation IV.4 shows the authorities’ reaction function for sterilizing the 
monetary effect that took place as a result of a variation in the reserves and the 
other two standard objectives of a Taylor Rule. These include economic activity 
- using the variable of production of electricity for industrial uses as a proxy - 
and inflation - measured as the consumer price index
71. In the equation, the 
level of reserve requirement is introduced (Figure III.12) because the authority 
could use this instrument to compensate for the effects on liquidity that were 
caused by variation in domestic assets
72. Finally, in addition to the dummy 
variable previously explained, changes in the fiscal balance are also introduced 
into the equation as one of the objectives for the monetary authorities to react. 
 
Therefore the estimation of the simultaneous equations  is
73: 
 
01 2 3 4 R I AD TOT Elect dev β ββ β β ∆=+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +                     
(Equation IV. 3)      
56 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 AD RI BF Elect Encaje Inflacion dev β ββ β β β β ∆= + ∆ + ∆+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +    
(Equation IV. 4) 
 
The results of the estimation, as shown in Table IV.1, present a high and 
significant (-0.57) compensation effect, which demonstrates the pressure on 
foreign reserves that resulted from domestic asset variation. The effect of the 
terms of trade is also high and significant (0.38). The coefficient associated with 
the proxy for economic activity is expected for this kind of specification. It is 
important to show that the authorities’ reaction was significant (-0.53) in the 
presence of economic activity falls. This is in accordance with the earlier 
assertion about the tendency of the authorities to realize countercyclical policy. 
The effect of reserves sterilization was significant (-0.59), even controlling for 
the reserve requirement increments that tried to diminish the effects of the 




                                                 
71 The source of both variables (production and inflation) was Revista del Banco de la 
República.  Its use may have significant limitations. On one hand, the use of the industrial 
production may not be the activity variable that the authority uses to take decisions and react. 
On the other hand, inflation use as the CPI may have a variable component (i.e. presence of 
food) that was not used for the authorities to react. But, the scarce information about monthly 
economic activity and prices made these assumptions necessary. The estimation with annual 
data is done in the appendix in a robustness test.  
72 At this particular point, we want to thank Miguel Urrutia for his remarks. 
73 Data used to estimate these equations have monthly frequency between January 1945 and 
March 1965, when the fixed parity was abolished. Domestic and external assets data were 
taken from money data that appeared in Revista del Banco de la República. Terms of trade 
were estimated as the quotient between the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the coffee 
price per pound in dollars, the product of the Producer Price Index in the U.S, and the 
Consumer Price Index in Colombia. Fiscal Balance is estimated as a percentage of the GDP, 
and reserve requirement represents the coefficient of reserve requirements of the ordinary 
deposits for the whole period. Trying to take into account the effect of the crises on the evolution 
of the variables, the measure of each variable was done estimating their proportion to the given 
value of the variable in the subsequent month of the devaluating episodes.   36























Note: d(x): difference of X. R is international reserves, AD is domestic assets, BF id fiscal
balance, ToT is terms of trade (Nominal exchange rate*coffee price/ PPI in U.S*CPI in
Colombia); and dev is a devaluation dummy. Statistics inside a paranthesis. (*) = level of
confidence 90%; (**) = level of confidence 95% ; (***) = level of confidence 99%. The sample
has monthly frequency between 1947.01 and 1967.03. The system of equations was
estimated by SUR method. Trying to capture the effect of crises in the evolution of the
variables, the proportion of those related to the value they had the month after each
devaluating episode (abolishing the observations of the next months to the crisis) was
estimated. Source: Revista del Banco de la República and estimations of the authors.
 
 
For a detailed examination of the authorities’ behavior in presence of the 
sterilization of the foreign reserves variation, a reaction function is estimated 
that introduces the changes of the domestic assets in the presence of lagged 
reserve changes. The possibility of the existence of a lagged response was 
examined even if it did not occur in the same month of the variation of the 
reserves. Bank reserve requirements were used as a control variable because 
the Central Bank could change them to diminish the fluctuation originated at the 
monetary base. Therefore, the following model was estimated: 
 
01 1 ... tt t t tt n t n ADR R R ω ωω η − −− − ∆= + ∆ +∆ + + ∆                          (Equation IV.5) 
Where  ω   and  η are the coefficients of the polynomial estimation
74 (See 
Dhrymes, 1971). The estimation was done for both the reserves variation, 
                                                 
74 These kinds of estimations are realized to find long run effects and lags of a single variable 
over the evolution of other variable. This specification is taken to avoid the colineality problems   37
introducing the positive and negative shock separately. The exercise was 
realized for a five month horizon (n=5) and the polynomial is of order 2. 
  
Table IV. 2. Dynamic reaction function 
0 -0.33962 -0.17235 -0.54045
1 -0.21595 -0.16693 -0.28045
2 -0.12393 -0.14649 -0.10641
3 -0.06355 -0.11104 -0.01832
4 -0.03482 -0.06058 -0.01617
5 -0.03773 0.0049 -0.09997
Note: dX = difference of X. R is International Reserves internacionales 
in pesos; R+ is positive reserves flow and R- the negative ones; AD 
Domestic Assets. Source: Revista del Banco de la República y 
estimations of the authors.(***) Conf. Of  99%
Lags d(R) d(R+)
-0.65249    
(***)
Sum of coefficients 
AD
-0.8156    
(***)
d(R-)




The results for this specific reaction function show that the Central Bank tended 
to keep sterilizing the external assets flows, in a larger magnitude (-0.815), 
during the five months subsequent to the shock. One observes that as the 
coefficient associated with the ordinary bank reserve requirement was not 
significant, the authorities’ reaction was focused on the increase in domestic 
assets. Finally, in the event of positive and negative flows, the reaction was 
significant, asymmetric, and larger in the presence of reductions in external 
assets. The coefficient related to this event (-1.06) indicate a monetary authority 
that overreacted when external assets declined. The dynamic of losses in 
reserves that took place when there was a pesos for dollar substitution was 
evidently overcompensated by the authority and, accordingly, lead to a vicious 
circle of money issuing and reserves loss. 
 
The last exercise attempts to determine the relative weight of either the 
monetary component or the real component in the foreign reserves loss 
explanation that preceded each devaluation. As shown in Table IV.1, both 
components are significant in the foreign reserves evolution. When just looking 
at the crisis episodes (reserves fall period), the exercise estimates the 
contribution of each of the components by weighting them with the coefficient 







                                                                                                                                               
founded when a simple regression of the independent variables lagged on the dependent 
variable is done. 
   38














Table IV.3 shows the results of the exercise, both aggregated (combining all the 
falling reserves episodes) and separately. While the monthly growth average 
rate observed for the external assets during the specified period is explained by 
the 122.9% variation in domestic assets, the terms of trade explained a 
proportion close to 8.7% of the total variation, despite any affect they may have 
had on foreign reserves. The electricity index variation affected the behavior of 
the reserves by 2.55%. The result is consistent in 5 out of 6 studied crises. 
 
Table IV.3. Decomposition of International Reserves Growth 
 
RI AD ELECT TOT AD ELECT TOT
TOTAL PERIOD -3.7% -4.6% -0.1% -0.3% 122.9% 2.5% 8.7%
1 CRISIS -2.1% -13.3% -0.1% -0.3% 642.6% 4.7% 14.3%
2 CRISIS -2.7% -0.3% 0.4% -0.7% 9.9% -14.3% 26.6%
3 CRISIS -4.6% -5.0% -0.3% -0.4% 109.1% 6.1% 7.8%
4 CRISIS -5.2% -2.2% 0.0% -0.3% 42.1% 0.4% 6.0%
5 CRISIS -7.7% -2.4% -0.3% 1.7% 31.5% 3.5% -22.4%
6 CRISIS -0.4% 0.0% -0.3% -1.0% 6.5% 71.1% 287.6%
Source: Cálculos de los autores.






These estimations provided evidence that supports the idea of the balance of 
payments crisis explained in the previous sections
75. Foreign reserves, 
assuming money demand stability, were affected negatively by the domestic 
assets increment. As expected of the Colombian economy during this period, 
the variation in the terms of trade was also significant in the foreign reserves 
evolution when surrounded by the influence of coffee price on the external 
sector. At the same time, the economic authorities reacted to variations in 
economic activity in a countercyclical way that increased domestic assets in the 
presence of declines in external assets. The reaction to the external assets 
                                                 
75 In the econometric Appendix the results of the simulation are shown according to a 
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variation was also asymmetrical, as it was greater when the foreign reserves, 
dominated by the Central Bank’s domestic credit increases, declined. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The six devaluations of the fixed parity period, 1938 – 1967, were complex, 
traumatic, highly political, and involved strong macroeconomic adjustments of 
the national economy. This paper traced the origins of the episodes and 
identified their causes. The initial hypothesis starts from the monetary approach 
of the balance of payments and assumes a monetary disequilibrium as the 
detonator of each balance of payments crises. The evaluation of the hypothesis 
was done using three instruments. First, a theoretical model that characterized 
the devaluation’s dynamic under fixed exchange rate was stated. Secondly, a 
narrative approach with the detailed analysis of the circumstances that 
surrounded each devaluation was given. Finally, some econometric tests were 
employed trying to identify the main causalities of some of the most important 
macroeconomic variables that explained the balance of payments crises. 
 
The theoretical model showed that devaluation could be the way to accelerate 
the macroeconomic adjustment in the presence of shocks to the income level 
that should have had as a counterpart, a fall in reserves. In fact, since countries 
were authorized to devaluate their currencies only in presence of fundamental 
disequilibrium in their balance of payments, this was the philosophy behind the 
possibility of devaluation after the Bretton Woods Agreement. However, the 
model also supports the main hypothesis of this paper, which states that the 
official reserve falls were the result of monetary disequilibrium, which was 
derived from expansionary monetary policies. 
 
The narrative approach supports the latter hypothesis, showing, in general, that 
devaluations were characterized by recurrent money market disequilibrium as a 
result of either fiscal disequilibrium or an overflow of money emission towards 
selected economic sectors. Equally, a tendency to delay the execution of the 
exchange adjustment through external trade control and restrictions can be 
observed. This occurred not only through the policies for exports fostering via 
exchange rate differentials, but also due to the fear that the devaluation would 
result in inflation due to the coffee revenues. This made the devaluation not only 
an adjustment instrument for the economy, but also a price control mechanism 
through exchange rate regime differentials between goods according to its 
inflationary effect. The result was a complex and difficult to manage exchange 
rate system. 
 
The statistical instruments offer quantitative evidence about the elements that 
produced the exchange rate disequilibrium. The first results supported the 
monetary approach when money demand was stable, opening the possibility 
that every monetary expansion would be transformed into a “compensation 
effect” because of official reserves loss. On average, over 100% of the foreign 
reserves loss that accompanied each balance of payments crises in Colombia 
was explained by a monetary disequilibrium -  i.e. an accelerated increase of 
the domestic assets of the Central Bank. Another important result was that a 
monetary authority that was not passive, reacted by sterilizing the effect of   40
variations in reserves on liquidity. That reinforced the hypothesis about the 
balance of payments crises since, during the period previous to the devaluation, 
the Central Bank abundantly emitted to sterilize the foreign currency flow, 
thereby creating the dynamic that preceded each devaluation. 
 
In spite of recognizing that the devaluating episodes are complex because of 
the political dynamic that they implicitly carry, which should be analyzed in 
further detail in subsequent papers, the evidence illustrates the external 
disequilibrium in Colombia during the fixed parity period. The money market 
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VII APPENDIX 
 
VII.A. Econometric tests  
Unit root and Money demand tests 
 
The annual variables that satisfied the money demand equation were subjected 
to three stationary or unit root tests: augmented Dickey-Fuller; Phillips-Perron 
and KPSS, finding non stationary evidence. So, following Engle and Granger 
(1987) an error correction model is estimated
76: 
 
[ ] t t p t p t t t Y Y Y Y Y ε αβ φ φ φ µ + − ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − − 1 2 2 1 1 ´ ...             (Equation VII.1) 
Where, [] ´ , , , t t t t t i Yr P M Y = . The model’s order (p=1) was estimated according to a 
multiple variable test of normality and error autocorrelation. Finally, the series’ 
evolution made us consider a model that introduces tendency in the 
cointegration vector and drift in the difference vector (usually named D Model). 
   
The tests exhibit the presence of cointegration. More importantly, the two tests 
accept the hypothesis of stability in the parameter of the money demand 
function (Figure VII.1)
77. It is important to emphasize that similar estimations 
were done by Salazar (1996) for the same period, finding stability in its 
parameters also. 
 
Table VII.1 Money demand: multivariable residual test 
     Multivariable Residual test 
     Normality  Autocorrelation 
Model Lags 
CI Vectors 
 (5%)  (Doornik-Hansen) LM(1)  LM(4)  Pormanteau(5) 
B  1  1  8.17 (0.4170)  14.23 (0.581)  20.24 (0.209)  67.07 (0.372) 
   2  2  12.05 (0.148)  12.54 (0.706)  16.99 (0.385)  54.18 (0.250) 
   3  3  22.37 (0.004)  9.36 (0.897)  13.02 (0.671)  73.86 (0.000) 
C  1  0  11.58 (0.170)  28.46 (0.027)  20.50 (0.198)  71.87 (0.233) 
   2  1  16.45 (0.036)  13.60 (0.628)  15.46 (0.491)  51.70 (0.331) 
   3  3  26.34 (0.000)  5.61 (0.991)  9.84 (0.874)  71.49 (0.000) 
D  1  1  11.63 (0.168)  27.43 (0.036)  20.73 (0.188)  71.33 (0.247) 
   2  1  16.28 (0.038)  14.23 (0.580)  15.42 (0.494)  52.69 (0.297) 
   3  2  27.28 (0.000)  6.60 (0.980)  11.48 (0.778)  78.72 (0.000) 




                                                 
76 The procedure follows the one did by Misas and Oliveros (1997) 
77 The parameter stability test Cusum (Squared Cusum) is based on the accumulative sum of 
the remainders (squared) of the estimation. The test shows the correspondent lines of the 
confidence interval with 5% of statistical error. The test finds parameter instability if the 
accumulated sum (squared) diverge of this line.   44
Figure VII.1 
Stability tests in money demand parameters 
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Annual Data Estimations 
 
Using monthly data for the fixed parity period, evidence that supports the 
existence of the compensation effect and the reaction of sterilization by the 
monetary authorities was presented. However, it is interesting to test 
robustness for the results using other variables that have annual frequency. 
Afterwards the results for the estimation are presented: 
 
•  Simultaneous approach 
 
The evidence presented shows the existence of a compensation effect and an 
active behavior of the monetary authorities that reacted by sterilizing the 
variation of external assets. Besides, the authorities’ reaction function was also 
affected by the variation of the public expenditure, as proved previously. 
Therefore, in this section we proceed to estimate a system of simultaneous 
equations whose specification introduces these results. The system is 
described by the following equations: 
 
                   01 2 3 4 tt t R AD Y i dev β ββ β β ∆= +∆ + + +                                      (Equation VII.2) 
56 7 8 9 1 0 tt ADR I Y E n c a je BFiscal dev ββ β β β β ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +  (Equation VII.3) 
As shown in Table VII.2 the compensation effect remains high and significant, 
even controlling by money demand variables. At the same time, the reaction 
function presents a monetary authority that “overreacted” to foreign reserves 
changes because the coefficient associated to variations in the domestic 
component of the monetary base is greater than 1, in absolute value. It is 
possible to observe that even if sterilization was high, the other available 
instrument to the monetary authorities, bank reserve requirement, was used to 
diminish the effect of the domestic assets increment. Besides, the fiscal result 
was another of the objective variables that caused a reaction from the 
authorities. Finally, the authorities also reacted to the presence of variation of   45
the output in a smaller proportion than in presence of variations of foreign 
reserves.  



















Statistics are inside a parenthesis. (*) = Confidence of 90%;
(**) = Confidence of 95% ;(***) = Confidence of 99%. Note:
The system of equations was estimated by SUR method. dX
= difference of X. R is International Reserves in pesos; AD is
Domestic Assets ; Y is real output; BF is the Fiscal Balance;
i is the domestic interest rate; Dev is adummy for each year
when the devaluations took place; Encaje is the reserve
requirement established by Banco de la República. Fiscal
Balance series was took from Junguito and Rincón (2004)
Sources: GRECO (2002); Revista del Banco de la República






VII.B Brief exchange rate legislation history during the fixed parity period 
 
In general, Wiesner (1978) identified three different exchange rate periods 
between 1948 and 1967. The first one between 1941 and 1957, in which was 
allowed a freely negotiable exchange rate certificates system, originated from 
foreign currency that came from the export of non traditional goods. This market 
officially functioned between 1948 and 1951, with another attempt in 1955 and 
1956. The second period begins in 1957 ending in 1965, with the creation and 
coexistence of two fluctuating exchange certificates and capital market. But 
again, one year after its beginning, the foreign currency purchase of the 
certificates market was instituted with fixed parity, periodically adjustable. The 
same thing happened some months later with the sale parity of the market. In 
the capital market side, between 1963 and 1964 Central Bank intervened the 
market to fix its price at $9.98 (purchase) and $9.99 (sale) which would be 
repeated in 1965. 
   46
The third period started in 1965 with the abolition of the certificates market and 
with the creation of three markets: preferential, intermediate and free. The 
difference between the first ones was settled in the kind of good that were 
included in each one of them. In both, the exchange rate was previously fixed 
by the authority. The third market was smaller than the others and foreign 
currency flotation was allowed. Again, as expected, this market was intervened 
a year after. This third and last sub period ended in March 1967 with the 
exchange rate reform to Decree – Law 44 that stated a double foreign currency 
market: exchange certificates and capital, whose transactions would exclusively 
be done through Central Bank and the authorized establishments.  
 
Even this is a brief synthesis of the exchange rate legislation history of the 
period, and its is shown that every new regime (that introduced a new parity), 
modifications to the exchange rate were more frequent than extraordinary. 
These modifications were always to increase the foreign currency price leading 
to a permanent devaluation of the Colombian peso. However, for practical 
purposes, a variation measure which explains the main devaluations of the 
period was necessary. As seen, with the proposed official parity series (sale), 6 
important devaluations were identified: December 1948, March 1951, June 
1957, November 1962, September 1965 and March 1967
78.  
 
The principal exchange regulation is now described: 
 
Figure VII.2 

























































































































































Official sale Exchange Certificates Average (Bolsa)






                                                 
78 It is important to clarify that those dates differed from Wiesner (1978), particularly the March 
1957 and September 1965 devaluations. About these two devaluations we are following 
Edwards and Santaella (1992) because we are taking as one the consecutive devaluations of 
1957 and 1958; and we take the three different market creations in 1965 as a 50% devaluation. 
The “Venta Oficial” (1941-1957), “Venta del Mercado de Certificados” (1957-1965) and  “Venta 
del Mercado Preferencial” (1965-1967) series were connected. Additionally, in 1967 the series 
was completed since March to December 1967 with the information of sales of the recently 
created Certificates Market through Decree 444/67.   47
 
 
(1) 1948.June:  Decrees 1949 and 1952 recognized a 10 point premium to some 
exports (coffee, banana, leather, metals, precious stones, cattle, meat, textile 
and manufactures with an import content). It created a system of freely 
negotiable exchange certificates, originated from foreign currency that came 
from exports different to the ones mentioned before, from oil capital imports, 
insurance indemnifications, and Colombian capital revenues in foreign countries 
or from foreign investment registered by the official market. Those certificates 
were “from free market but not for free application”, so they would be used with 
the priority criteria that the “Oficina de Cambios” stated. The tax to money 
orders to foreign countries that was previously established in 4%, rose to 14, 20 
and 30% according to the kind of goods. 
 
(2) 1948.  December  10:  Law 90 devaluated the peso from $1,75 to $1,95. The 10 
point premium was abolished. The use of the exchange rate certificates was 
limited. 
 
(3) 1951.March  20:  Decree 637 abolished exports and imports restrictions (except 
for the ones listed in the forbidden imports that appeared in Decree 638); 
abolished the certificates market and disposed that all the operations in foreign 
currency had to be done through Central Bank at the fixed sale and purchase 
exchange rates of $2,51 and $2,50, correspondingly, except for coffee foreign 
currency that would be settled at 75% with a $1,95 rate and 25% at a $2,5 rate. 
This was the first attempt of exchange convergence.  
 
(4) 1955  May  13: Decree 1372 legalized a free dollar market (making more 
complex the exchange market) whose supply would be foreign currencies that 
came from minerals, rice, corn , tobacco, textiles, leather and other exports that 
were previously used to pay an imports tax; as the ones that came from 
services, tourism and commissions. Such currencies would be destined to 





1955 October: Decree 2797 reallocated goods from a group with low 
registration taxes to a group with higher taxes, trying to diminish imports. 
 
1955 November: Freights, royalties, commissions and banking expenses may 
be ordered to other countries with free dollars. Foreign currency form banana 
exports are included. 
 
1956 April: It was restricted the use of official dollar for rough materials and 
essential elements for domestic production. 
 
1956 November 30: Decree 2929 established that every foreign currency that 
did not have the obligation of being sold at the official rate may be delivered to 
Central Bank in exchange for currency tittles (making more complex the 
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Figure VII.3 






















































































































































(5)   1957  June  17:  Decree 107 created a free exchange rate regime with the 
coexistence of two fluctuating markets: exchange rate certificates and capital. A 
forbidden imports list was stated, the quantitative restriction to other imports 
was abolished and it was instituted a 15% ad-valorem tax for every export and a 
10% tax to money orders. The coffee differential reappeared. 
 
(6)  1958 March 26: Decrees 80 and 102 introduced the following modifications to 
the system: a/ foreign currency purchase with fixed exchange rate, periodically 
adjustable; b/ foreign currency sale in a fluctuating market through public sales; 
c/ a fraction of the certificates market demand reallocated to the capital market; 
d/ 15% retention tax for exported coffee was created. 
  1959 January 16: Law 1
st approved: a/ imports classification in forbidden, 
license requirements and free; b/ foreign currency sale of exports different to 
coffee, banana, leather, precious stones at a free market exchange rate; c/ 
creation of a regulatory exchange fund to stabilize the exchange certificates 
market; d/ confirmation of the coffee tax; e/ ad-valorem 15% tax for every 
import; f/ stimulus to minor exports. 
 
(7) 1960  May  13:  Resolution 20 of the Central Bank’s Board of Directors increased 
the sale rate of the certificates to $6,5. As Decree 80/58 modified the exchange 
rate certificates regime, they established that if in 4 consecutive weeks, after 
July 26 1958, the sale price of those documents exceeded, in more than 60 
points, the purchase price fixed, it can be adjusted by Central Bank.  
 
(8)  1962 November 20: The certificates sale price was fixed at $9 since the 20
th 
and the purchase price at $7,1 since the 27
th of the same month. Additionally 
through Law 83 of 1962 the modification to Law 1
st of 1959 was approved by 
Congress, according to the IMF proposal to do a direct devaluation. This 
devaluation included the arrival to the free market of banana, platinum and 
leather, such as the creation of a foreign currency fund for the financing of 
capital imports and the previous financing of exports. 
   49
(9) 1963  February:  Central Bank intervened the capital market to stabilize its sale 
price at $9,99 and its purchase price at $9,98. 
 
 1964  October: Resolution 46 of the Monetary Board suspended the free dollars 
sale as an exchange regulation fund’s intervention in the capital market, as a 
result of foreign reserves fall. 
 
 1965  February:  A new intervention to the capital market was authorized and it 
increased the foreign currency percentage limit that Central Bank could 
designate to this market. The coffee restitution was modified to affect the capital 
market. 
 
 1965  June:  Resolution 20 of the Monetary Board stated that foreign currency, 
different to the one of coffee exports,  would be sold to Central Bank at a $13,5 
rate, except for the fraction that corresponded to the non-refundable component 
of the export.   
 
 1965  June  29:  It was abolished the system of paying the minor exports at a rate 
equal to the free market average rate of the previous week and it was stated 
that Central Bank purchased the foreign currency of those exports at the rate 
fixed by the Monetary Board, avoiding that the free market exchange rate pulled 
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(10) 1965  September:  Decree 2322 introduced the following reforms to the 
exchange rate system: a/ the certificates market was abolished and two 
markets were created: preferential and intermediate. Coffee foreign currency 
and the one of exports with a 50% or more import component would be in the 
first market, at a $8,5 purchase rate and a $9 sale rate and it would be used for 
the payments of goods mentioned in the preferential list. National Government 
expenditure in foreign currency, amortization of the external debt interests, 
students’ expenses and payment of domestic oil refining would be in the first 
market also. In the second market, there would be foreign currency of exports   50
different to coffee, gold purchases, investment recorded by this market and 
public and private credit, and they would be used for the payment of goods that 
were not included in the preferential list, freights and amortization or interests of 
public or private debts registered (when they did not have access to the 
preferential market). The exchange rate of the intermediate market was at a 
$13,5 sale and purchase rate. 
b/ It was instituted a system of capital investment inscription and it disposed that 
its refunds and profits would be transferred with free foreign currency, except 
when they were registered by the intermediate market subject to other 
conditions. 
c/ It was instituted a regime of external debts register. The sale rate for oil 
capital imports was still at $7,67.  
By Decree 2373 of September 6 the coffee retention was rose to 16%. 
 
(11) 1966  November:  Decree 2867 established that the Central Bank was the only 
one that could sell and purchase foreign currency, fixing the purchase and sell 
rates at $16,25 and $16,30, which were freely negotiable since that date; it 
abolished free imports of goods and established the priorities to make payments 
to foreign countries. By Resolution 47 the exchange rate of coffee foreign 
currency was raised to $9.94 and Decree 2897 raised the coffee retention to 
19%. 
 
(12) 1967  March:  Exchange reform; Decree- Law 444 established a double foreign 
currency market: exchange certificates and capital, whose transactions would 
be done through Central Bank and the authorized credit establishments. The 
coffee tax changed, represented by an exchange differential with a 26%ad-
valorem tax where 4 points would be destined to the National Coffee Fund and 
the remainder to the National Treasure through the CEC. A gradual decrease of 
one point per month was announced. The sale rate for oil foreign currency was 
still at $9 according to Resolution 13 of March. 
 
 
 
 